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REBUTTING OBVIOUSNESS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY: SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS OF ANALOGS 
 
Jolie D. Lechner* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Pharmaceutical companies depend on patent protection to recuperate the high costs of 
research and development. In regards to the patentability of structurally related 
compounds, the courts must decide whether a compound is obvious in view of its 
structurally similar prior art. In general, a compound is non-obvious over the structurally 
related prior art if the compound exhibits unexpected results. However, placing primary 
emphasis on a compound’s unexpected properties is out of step with the realities of drug 
development. For example, during drug development, chemists will modify a 
compound’s structure until they produce a compound that exhibits optimal pharmakinetic 
properties. This iterative process relies on the perseverance of scientists to pave the road 
to drug discovery—not unexpected results.  
 
This Note advocates for the elevation of the failure of others to make a drug that benefits 
society and the long-felt but unmet need for that treatment in the obviousness inquiry. 
These factors highlight the underappreciated realities of the drug discovery process, the 
immense effort that precedes a drug’s delivery to market, and the profound effect 
pharmaceuticals can have on disease treatment. In giving greater credence to the failure 
of others to develop a drug and the unmet need for that treatment, courts can resolve the 
current disconnect between the laboratory and patent law. By rewarding innovators that 
embark on a logical research plan that ends in the development of a beneficial drug, 
patent law will encourage companies to invest in drug development and produce drugs 
that benefit society.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  “[P]atents are not barred just because it was obvious ‘to explore a new technology 
or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation.’”1 This was 
illustrated early on in The Incandescent Lamp Patent case.2 In that case, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a patent for an incandescent lamp that used a conductor composed of 
“fibrous or textile material.”3 While the Court reasoned that the specification was “too 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Ph.D., 2009, University of 
Pittsburgh; B.S., 2003, The Pennsylvania State University. The author would like to thank Professors 
Jacqueline Lipton and Raymond Ku for their helpful comments and Matthew Lechner for his never-ending 
support.  
1 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re 
O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
2 The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895). 
3 Id. at 471. 
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indefinite . . . [for a] valid monopoly,” the Court’s decision was grounded in economics.4 
Simply put, the plaintiffs’ lamp “was never a commercial success” due to the “defective” 
lamp chamber.5 It was Thomas Edison, the alleged infringer, who produced a domestic 
lamp fit for the marketplace. While Edison’s design certainly had precedents in earlier, 
ineffective incandescent lamp designs, his ceaseless efforts to perfect the device resulted 
in a working product. Only after extensive experimentation with conductor thickness, 
“thirty or forty different woods of exogenous growth,” and various types of bamboo from 
China and Japan did Edison develop a useful light bulb.6 This invention met society’s 
long-felt but unmet need for artificial light at night. As a result, the Court refused to allow 
the plaintiffs’ “imperfectly successful experiments” to stand in the way of Edison’s 
“brilliant discover[y].”7  
 
The issues underlying the Supreme Court’s decision are still relevant in patent law 
today. While the statutory definition of non-obviousness8 did not exist at the time of The 
Incandescent Lamp Patent, the Court placed emphasis on factors like the failure of the 
other inventors to create a working lamp and the public’s long-felt need for artificial 
light.9 Today, courts look to these factors, called secondary considerations, as evidence of 
non-obviousness, which is a requirement for patentability.10  
 
In the pharmaceutical industry, evaluating the non-obviousness of new chemical 
compounds requires a nuanced analysis.11 Drug development is “profoundly affected” by 
structurally related compounds like enantiomers, isomers, and analogs. 12  Thus, the 
statutory hurdle of non-obviousness 13  plays an increasingly important role in the 
patentability of such compounds. The Federal Circuit has maintained that “structural 
similarity between claimed and prior art subject matter, proved by combining references 
                                                
4 Id. at 477. 
5 Id. at 471. 
6 Id. at 473-74.  
7 Id. at 474. 
8 In 1952 Congress codified the non-obviousness requirement of patentability in 35 U.S.C. §103; for 
commentary regarding the enactment of 35 U.S.C. §103 see CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 321-26 
(2008). 
9 The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. at 471-77. 
10 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 
(2007) (reaffirming Graham v. John Deere Co.). 
11 While structurally similar compounds can appear deceptively obvious, making small changes in a 
compound’s structure can result in molecules with vastly different biological and pharmacological 
properties. As a result, structurally related compounds have presented the courts with a complex 
obviousness analysis that has evolved into a distinct area of patent law. See Rebecca M. Wilson & Samuel 
J. Danishefsky, Small Molecule Natural Products in the Discovery of Therapeutic Agents: The Synthesis 
Connection, 71 J. ORG. CHEM. 8329, 8336 (2006) (“Even with all of the advances, ours is a fickle science 
of limited predictive capacity. The fact that so much success has been accomplished should not obscure the 
fact that there is so much that we do not know how to do at all, or can do only poorly.”); In re Jones, 958 
F.2d 347, 349 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that “[t]he question of ‘structural similarity’ in chemical patent cases 
has generated a body of patent law unto itself”). 
12 For a minireview regarding the challenge presented by the structurally related compounds atropisomers 
see Jonathan Clayden et al., The Challenge of Atropisomerism in Drug Discovery, 48 ANGEW. CHEM. INT. 
ED. 6398, 6398 (2009). 
13 35 U.S.C. §103. 
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or otherwise, where the prior art gives reason or motivation to make the claimed 
compositions, creates a prima facie case of obviousness.”14 In other words, a lead 
compound’s structure can provide motivation for further structural modifications 
resulting in new, but obvious compounds.15 For example, the Federal Circuit in In re 
Dillon considered the obviousness of tetra-orthoesters with respect to tri-orthoesters in 
the area of fuel chemistry.16 While both classes of compounds function as fuel additives, 
tetra-orthoesters reduce the emission of solid particulates during combustion whereas tri-
orthoesters prevent phase separation between fuel and alcohol co-solvents.17 Despite this 
difference, due to the structural similarity between tetra- and tri-orthoesters and their 
similar applications as fuel additives, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that the applicant’s 
tetra-orthoesters were prima facie obvious.18 Furthermore, the court noted that the 
applicant “had the opportunity to rebut the prima facie case,” but failed to demonstrate 
that the tetra-orthoesters possessed “unexpectedly improved properties” over the prior 
art.19 
 
As illustrated by In re Dillon, courts have tuned the obviousness analysis in 
chemical patent cases to center on unpredictable results. Thus, a patentee can rebut the 
prima facie case of obviousness based on structural similarity if the claimed compound 
“possess[es] unexpectedly improved properties” over the prior art.20 To date, case law has 
“recogniz[ed] the vital role” of unexpected results in defeating obviousness allegations in 
the context of structural similarity.21 For example, consider the obviousness of Type 2 
diabetes drug pioglitazone, which belongs to a known class of compounds called 
thiazolidinediones (“TZDs”).22 While pioglitazone has a close structural relationship to a 
prior art compound with antidiabetic activity, the Federal Circuit held that the 
compound’s “unexpectedly superior properties” rendered the molecule non-obvious.23 
Likewise, in Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, the Federal Circuit 
reaffirmed that risedronate, the active ingredient of P&G’s osteoporosis drug Actonel®, 
                                                
14 Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Alphapharm. Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re 
Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 
1086 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Precedent establishes the analytical procedure whereby a close structural similarity 
between a new chemical compound and prior art compounds is generally deemed to create a prima facie 
case of obviousness.”); In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 314-15 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (noting “the presumption of 
obviousness based on close structural similarity”); see generally Helmuth A. Wegner, Prima Facie 
Obviousness of Chemical Compounds, 6 APLA Q. J. 271 (1978) (discussing prima facie obviousness of 
structurally related compounds such as homologs, isomers, stereoisomers, etc.). 
15 Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd., 492 F.3d at 1356 (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
16 In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 690-91 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
17 Id. at 690. 
18 Id. at 692. 
19 Id. at 692-93.  
20 Id. at 692-93.  
21 Takeda Chem. Indus., 492 F.3d 1350, 1364 (Dyk, J., concurring); see also Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 
480 F.3d 1348, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding a species claim obvious because Pfizer “simply failed to 
prove that the results [were] unexpected”); Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 
1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the district court’s finding that “the purportedly unexpected property of 
pantoprazole is in fact an expected property . . . . [showing] a sufficient case of obviousness to defer the 
matter for trial on the merits”).  
22 Takeda Chem. Indus., 492 F.3d at 1352-53. 
23 Id. at 1361-62. 
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was non-obvious due to unexpected properties.24 In reaching its decision, the Federal 
Circuit placed emphasis on a researcher’s testimony that she was “very surprised” at 
risedronate’s efficacy and a doctor’s statement that “the superior properties of risedronate 
were unexpected and could not have been predicted.”25  
 
The reasoning underlying the relationship between patentability and unpredictable 
results is understandable: how could an invention be obvious if its properties catch the 
inventor off-guard? But this test is often at odds with the reality of how drug 
development is performed.26 For example, in small molecule R & D, chemists will make 
minor modifications to a lead compound’s structure with the goal of optimizing its 
efficacy and safety.27 The compounds that show promising activity are subjected to 
animal studies as well as human testing during three consecutive phases of clinical 
trials.28 During this long and expensive process, many compounds are abandoned along 
the way due to insufficient efficacy and safety concerns.29 All the while, chemists 
continue to modify the lead structure until optimal pharmakinetic properties are 
achieved.30 This methodical process relies on the perseverance of scientists to pave the 
road to drug discovery—not on unpredictable results.31  
 
The disconnect between laboratory methods and the courtroom’s standards for 
obviousness threatens to stifle the development of innovative drugs. Pharmaceutical 
science is a risky business that relies on patent protection to fuel costly research and 
development.32 For example, developing a new drug fit for the marketplace can take 
                                                
24 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 997. 
25 Id.  
26 See Kristen C. Buteau, Deuterated Drugs: Unexpectedly Nonobvious?, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 22, 23 (2009) 
(commenting that “pharmaceutical patents are especially susceptible to an obviousness challenge because 
the natural progression of science necessarily builds upon past discoveries and requires considerable 
experimentation through trial and error, thereby potentially rendering the invention obvious-to-try”). 
27 See generally RICHARD B. SILVERMAN, THE ORGANIC CHEMISTRY OF DRUG DESIGN AND DRUG ACTION, 
17-61 (2d ed. 2004). 
28 For a description of clinical trials during drug development see Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 151, 155-56 
(2003). 
29  YALI FRIEDMAN, BUILDING BIOTECHNOLOGY: BUSINESS, REGULATIONS, PATENTS, LAW, POLITICS, 
SCIENCE 45-46 (3d ed. 2008) (commenting that “[t]he Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development 
found that only five in five thousand small-molecule compounds that enter pre-clinical testing make it to 
human testing. Of these five, only one is approved”).  
30 SILVERMAN, supra note 27, at 17-18; Expert Report of John G. Gleason, Ph.D. on Patent Validity at 4, 
Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., SRL v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 07-1596 (GEB)(JJH), 2009 WL 
3153316 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2009). 
31 SILVERMAN, supra note 27, at 17 (noting that, “rational approaches [in drug development] are directed at 
lead discovery. It is not possible, with much accuracy, to foretell toxicity and side effects, anticipate 
transport characteristic, or predict the metabolic fate of a drug. Once a lead is identified, its structure can be 
modified until an effective drug is prepared”).  
32  Michael Enzo Furrow, Analyzing the Laws, Regulations, and Policies Affecting FDA-Regulated 
Products: Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v. Teleflex, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
275, 278 (2008); see also Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (“We have long acknowledged the importance of the patent system in encouraging innovation. 
Indeed, ‘the encouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant, and is 
based directly on the right to exclude.’ . . . Importantly, the patent system provides incentive to the 
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innovator drug firms ten to fifteen years33 and cost $1.5 billion per drug.34 With little 
more than the hope of unpredictable results to rely on in obtaining much-needed patent 
rights, pharmaceutical companies will not invest in the lengthy and uncertain process of 
drug discovery.35 Considering that “pharmaceutical products increase longevity, improve 
the quality of life, and often result in medical cost savings,”36 courts should rely on 
objective indicia of non-obviousness that do not “penalize[] people in areas of endeavor 
where advances are won only by great effort and expense.”37  
 
Giving greater credence to additional considerations, such as the failure of others 
to develop a drug that fulfills society’s long-felt need for disease treatment, will 
encourage companies to develop drugs that benefit society.38 Unlike the unpredictable 
results analysis, these factors (1) reward innovators that have the skill to execute a bright 
idea; and (2) encourage companies to pursue difficult projects whose completion can 
greatly benefit society. In other words, a company could give their support to a 
“researcher [who] dared to follow a logical plan”39 with some confidence that their 
support would be rewarded. 
 
The introduction of this Note introduces the real-world significance of others’ 
failures to meet a long-felt but unmet societal need in advancing technology. Part I 
provides background into the patent system and the obviousness of structurally related 
compounds. Part II uses two recent pharmaceutical patent cases, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sicor 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 40  and Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharmaceuticals, SRL v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,41 to illustrate the paramount role of (1) others’ unsuccessful 
efforts; and (2) the societal benefits of the drugs that meet a long-felt need in establishing 
non-obviousness. Part III proposes that courts should place primary emphasis on the 
failure of others and long-felt need in the obviousness analysis of structurally related 
                                                                                                                                            
innovative drug companies to continue costly development efforts.”) (quoting Sanofi-Synthelabo v. 
Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
33 Furrow, supra note 32, at 278. 
34 Id. at 283.  
35 See Carmelo Giaccotto et al., Drug Prices and Research and Development Investment Behavior in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 48 J. LAW & ECON. 195, 211 (2005) (commenting that scholars have argued that 
“the most innovative drugs are riskier and costlier to produce but presumably have the greatest social 
benefits”). 
36 Id. at 195. 
37 In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1100 (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (arguing that the obvious-to-try test 
should not be applied to research areas that are high cost and labor-intensive, e.g., pharmaceuticals). 
38 See Joseph P. Meara, Note, Just Who is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s 
Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 295-96 (2002) (“Long-felt need and failure of others to 
make the invention should not be utilized as ‘secondary’ considerations, but rather as objective evidence of 
actual skill in the art . . . When a problem is old in the art and has been the subject of more than de minimus 
research, it suggests that no one of any skill level was able to solve it. When combined with actual evidence 
that others failed to solve the problem, one can infer that the solution has eluded those of ordinary skill.”). 
39 In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d at 1100 (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (arguing that the obvious-to-try analysis is 
inapplicable to the pharmaceutical field because the test would render any effective drug obvious simply 
because it followed from “a logical research plan”).  
40 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sicor Pharm., Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 971 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
41 Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., SRL v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 07-1596 (GEB)(DEA), 2009 WL 
3153316 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2009).  
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compounds like analogs. Finally, this Article concludes that the patent system’s 
recognition of others’ unsuccessful efforts to satisfy a long-felt need is necessary to 
encourage drug development.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND: REQUIREMENTS FOR PATENTABILITY 
 
A.  The Patent System 
 
Patent law is grounded in incentives.42 The United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”) induces inventors to disclose their discovery to the public by offering a 
financial reward.43 To obtain a patent, the inventor must disclose subject matter that is 
novel,44 useful,45 and non-obvious.46 Patent law’s novelty requirement bars a patent for 
an invention that is not new.47 For example, an invention is not novel if “it was made 
before; it was sold more than a year before a patent application was filed; or it was 
otherwise subject to prior use or knowledge.”48 In addition to being novel, patent-worthy 
inventions must be useful.49 This requirement is easily met, as an invention need only 
work under experimental conditions.50  
 
The “final gatekeeper of the patent system” is the non-obviousness requirement.51 
Obviousness is regarded as the “ultimate condition of patentability”52 because it evaluates 
the technical merits of an invention.53 This statutory prerequisite considers “whether an 
invention is a big enough technical advance” to warrant patent protection.54 While non-
obviousness is “the most important requirement”55 for patentability, it has catalyzed 
“controversy”56 regarding the patentability of structurally similar compounds.57  
                                                
42 Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 14 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 147 (2004); but see David Conforto, Traditional and Modern-Day Biopiracy: Redefining the 
Biopiracy Debate, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 358, 367-68 (2004) (arguing that patent law disincentives 
scientific breakthroughs because patent rights are awarded to a “MegaPharm” company rather than the 
“innovator who actually makes the discovery”); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of 
Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (1992) (noting that “it is safe to say there is a consensus among 
economists that in the aggregate patents offer only a very limited incentive to invent”).  
43 NARD, supra note 8, at 2.  
44 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
45 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
46 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
47 35 U.S.C. § 102; see also NARD, supra note 8, at 187-88.  
48 Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 
CAL. L. REV. 803, 811 (1988). 
49 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
50 Merges, supra note 48, at 812. 
51 Id. 
52 NONOBVIOUSNESS: THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980). 
53 Merges, supra note 48, at 812. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See Donald R. Dunner & Ronald P. Kananen, Nonobviousness and the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals—Twenty-Five Years in Review, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 52, at 3:114 (commenting “that 
Section 103 is, despite its seeming clarity, a generator of controversy”). 
57 In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 349 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The question of ‘structural similarity’ in chemical 
patent cases has generated a body of patent law unto itself.”) (citing Helmuth A. Wegner, supra note 14). 
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B. Determining Obviousness 
 
In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court outlined the test for 
determining obviousness.58 The Court determined that “[u]nder [35 U.S.C.] § 103, the 
scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art 
and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the 
pertinent art resolved.”59 Notably, the Supreme Court authorized courts to also use 
secondary considerations such as commercial success, the failure of others, long-felt but 
unmet needs,60 and unexpected results in evaluating obviousness.61  
 
Secondary considerations, 62  also called objective considerations, consider 
“evidence outside the intrinsic features of the invention and focus on the real-world 
circumstances surrounding [an invention’s] origin and commercialization.”63 When there 
is a nexus between such considerations and the merits of the claimed invention,64 
secondary considerations “alone may defeat a claim of obviousness.”65 Moreover, such 
objective considerations “may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the 
record.”66 Thus, secondary considerations are not just “icing on the cake,”67 but “must be 
considered before the conclusion on obviousness is reached.”68 For example, in Eli Lilly 
& Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals,69 the District Court for the Southern District 
of Indiana opined that even though the defendants “failed to establish a prima facie case 
of structural obviousness [of the drug olanzapine] . . . . the court is required to examine 
the objective evidence of nonobviousness in the record.”70 Thus, only after the court 
evaluated: (1) the long-felt need for a better antipsychotic drug like olanzapine; (2) the 
failure of others to develop a safe antipsychotic drug; (3) olanzapine’s commercial 
                                                
58 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 550 U.S. 398, 406 (reaffirming 
Graham v. John Deere Co.). 
59 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 17. 
60 Id. at 17-18; see Merges, supra note 48, at 816-19 for commentary regarding the origins of secondary 
considerations. 
61 U.S. v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. at 416. 
62 Honorable Giles Rich commented that he did “not believe the Supreme Court intended to signify 
anything by the term ‘secondary’. . . . [and that secondary considerations should] be looked upon for what 
they factually are, circumstantial evidence of unobviousness of the highest probative value[.]” Giles S. 
Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 52, at 1:513. 
63 Merges, supra note 48, at 816. 
64 Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 668 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool 
Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).  
65 Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 713, 749 (N.D.W. Va. 2004), aff’d 161 
Fed. Appx. 944 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
66 Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
67 Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
68 Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., SRL v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2009 WL 3153316, at *50 (quoting 
Hybritech Inc., 802 F.2d at 1380). 
69 Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals is now known as Ivax Pharmaceuticals, Inc. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
70 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 2d 820, 905-06 (S.D. Ind. 2005), aff’d, 471 
F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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success; (4) the drug’s industry acclaim; and (5) the compound’s unexpected results, did 
the court conclude olanzapine was unobvious.71  
 
II.  REBUTTING THE OBVIOUSNESS OF ANALOGS 
 
A. Introduction to Drug Discovery and Analogs 
 
Most drugs are classified as structurally specific, meaning that they act at specific 
sites like a receptor or enzyme.72 So, the activity and potency of structurally specific 
drugs are “very susceptible to small changes in chemical structure.”73 During drug 
discovery, chemists will modify a lead compound to generate structurally related 
compounds, called analogs.74 This iterative process allows researchers to determine how 
a compound’s biological activity is affected by structural modifications.75 After enough 
analogs are prepared and studied, researchers can make conclusions regarding structure-
activity relationships.76 Chemists will continue to make changes to a lead compound’s 
structure until its pharmakinetic properties77 are optimized and its toxicity is minimized.78 
 
To illustrate the role of analogs in drug development, consider the compounds in 
Figure 1. Modifying the structure of lead compound A (called sulfanilamide when R = H) 
resulted in analogs possessing diuretic, antidiabetic, and antimicrobial properties.79 In 
order to understand the relationship between the compound’s structure and its biological 
effects, over 10,000 compounds resembling compound A were synthesized and subjected 
to biological testing.80 The results demonstrated that the skeletal framework present in all 
compounds (shown in blue) was responsible, in part, for the observed biological 
activity.81 However, analogs with different functional groups at the 4 position often 
resulted in decreased potency.82 Thus, structure-activity-relationship studies, such as the 
development of compounds B-D, allow scientists to modify the lead compound’s 
structure to optimize its pharmakinetic properties.83  
 
                                                
71 Id. at 906-09. 
72 SILVERMAN, supra note 27, at 21-22. 
73 Id. at 21.  
74 Expert Report of John G. Gleason, Ph.D. on Patent Validity at 4, Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., SRL v. 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 07-1596 (GEB)(JJH), 2009 WL 3153316 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2009); for a 
definition of analog see TRUDY MCKEE & JAMES R. MCKEE, BIOCHEMISTRY: AN INTRODUCTION 388 (Kent 
A. Peterson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999).  
75 SILVERMAN, supra note 27, at 21-22. 
76 Id. at 22. 
77 Pharmacokinetic properties refer to a compound’s absorption, distribution, and metabolism in the body, 
see Gleason, supra note 74, at 4. 
78 Id. 
79 SILVERMAN, supra note 27, at 10, 22. 
80 Id. at 22. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.; see also Gleason, supra note 74, at 4. 
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Figure 1: Analogs of sulfanilamide  
 
B  The Failure of Others and Long-felt but Unmet Needs 
 
Advancing science is hard work. Even serendipitous discoveries are grounded in 
the daily grind of research. As discussed earlier, Thomas Edison was not immediately 
successful in his efforts towards a durable incandescent lamp conductor.84 Only after 
extensive experimentation with nearly forty types of bamboo, which he acquired after 
dispatching a messenger to China and Japan, did Edison bring the domestic lamp into 
existence.85 In so doing, Edison was the first of “a large number of persons, in various 
countries” to realize this goal.86 Stated differently, Edison’s success amidst the failure of 
others highlighted the technical merit of his invention.  
 
Just as a chemist will attach different functional groups to a lead compound, 
Edison substituted bamboo for other conductors in an existing lamp design. Though the 
argument could be made that Edison’s development was obvious, it ended in a product 
that met society’s desire for artificial light.87 To this end, an invention that improves the 
quality of life by satisfying a societal need should be rewarded. Although “long-felt need 
does not prove that the race actually occurred or that the patentee won it,”88 it does set the 
parameters of competition by defining a goal. Furthermore, as shown in Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Sicor Pharmaceuticals, Inc.89 and Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharmaceuticals, SRL v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,90 patent law rewards inventors who enrich the public domain 
by achieving such goals, even in the face of allegations of obviousness.  
 
 
i.  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sicor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
 
1. Background of Nucleoside Analogs and Gemcitabine 
                                                
84 The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1895). 
85 Id. at 474. 
86 Id. at 471. 
87 See Tom Arnold, Future Considerations—Views of a Private Practitioner, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra 
note 52, at 8:5 (commenting that “many of our most worthwhile inventions, including Edison’s electric 
light patent . . . . would have been obvious to all [based upon prior art]”). 
88 Merges, supra note 48, at 872. 
89 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sicor Pharm., Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 971 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
90 Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., SRL v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2009 WL 3153316 (D.N.J., Aug. 19, 
2009).  
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The case of Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sicor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 91  concerns the 
patentability of gemcitabine, which is sold for the treatment of ovarian, breast, lung, and 
pancreatic cancer by Eli Lilly under the trade name Gemzar® (Figure 2).92 Nucleoside 
analogs, like gemcitabine, are structurally related to naturally occurring nucleosides, 
which are the building blocks of DNA.93 As shown in Figure 2, nucleosides consist of a 
five-carbon sugar ring attached to a base.94 To avoid confusion when identifying atoms in 
the base and sugar components, a superscript prime is used to label the atoms of the sugar 
ring.95  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The naturally occurring nucleoside 2’-deoxycytidine and  
nucleoside analog gemcitabine 
 
“The chemical modification of nucleosides . . . [is] a major research topic in 
bioorganic and medicinal chemistry.”96 Investigations into this class of compounds have 
resulted in “life-saving drugs” that treat cancer and infectious diseases.97 Modified 
nucleosides can function as “anticancer or antiviral agents because they are similar 
enough in structure to naturally occurring nucleosides that cells are tricked into accepting 
them, but are different enough to disrupt cell functioning and replication once inside the 
cell.”98  
 
Because of the potential application of modified nucleosides to disease treatment, 
chemists have been looking for biologically active nucleoside analogs “at least since the 
1960s.”99 However, from the 1960s to the 1980s the synthesis of biologically active 
nucleoside analogs “was largely a matter of serendipity.”100 Moreover, during the early 
1980s, “fluorine chemistry as applied to the nucleoside field was relatively new, and little 
                                                
91 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sicor Pharm., Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 971. 
92 Id. at 975. 
93 Id. at 979. 
94 Id.  
95 TRUDY MCKEE & JAMES R. MCKEE, supra note 74, at 393-94. 
96  Piet Herdewijn, Preface of MODIFIED NUCLEOSIDES: IN BIOCHEMISTRY, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 
MEDICINE, at XIX (Piet Herdewijn ed. 2008). 
97 Id. 
98 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 
99 Id. 
100 Piet Herdewijn, supra note 96, at XIX. 
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was known about how one might synthesize difluorinated nucleosides.”101 The key 
difficulty in synthesizing gemcitabine was incorporating the two fluorine atoms at the C-
2’ position of the sugar group (see Figure 2).102 Even years after Eli Lilly produced 
gemcitabine, one medicinal chemist wrote, “the synthesis of fluorinated nucleosides is 
still a difficult task.”103  
 
2.  The Race for Gemcitabine 
 
Researchers at the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center began investigating the 
biological activity of fluorinated nucleosides in the 1960s.104 These efforts resulted in 
fluorinated nucleoside analogs 2’-F-ara-C105 and 2’-F-cytidine,106 which possess a single 
fluorine atom attached to the 2’ carbon on the sugar ring (Figure 3). While these 
compounds exhibited promising anticancer activity,107 they were not fully examined for 
their medical utility until the late 1970s and early 1980s.108 
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Figure 3: Structures of 2’-F-ara-C and 2’-F-cytidine  
 
In the 1980s, the application of fluorine chemistry to nucleosides still remained 
largely unexplored.109 In particular, little was known about how to synthesize nucleosides 
possessing two fluorine atoms attached to the same carbon (a geminal fluorine group).110 
Dr. Mirslav Bobek, a medicinal chemist at Roswell Park Memorial Institute in Buffalo, 
New York, spent most of his career developing methods to access therapeutic nucleoside 
analogs.111 As shown in Figure 4, Dr. Bobek was successful at attaching two fluorine 
atoms to the carbon atom outside of the sugar (called a gem-difluorosaccharide).112 
However, he was unable to extend this methodology to the synthesis of gemcitabine and 
                                                
101 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 980. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 981. 
105 A. Kyoichi et al., Nucleosides. 110. Synthesis and Antiherpes Virus Activity of Some 2’-Fluoro-2’-
deoxyarabinofuranosylpyrimidine Nucleosides, 22 J. MED. CHEM. 21, 21-22, (1979). 
106 Iris L. Doerr & Jack J. Fox, Nucleosides. XXXIX. 2’-Deoxy-2’-fluorocytidine, 1-ß-D-ArabinofuranosyI-
2-amino-l,4(2H)-4-iminopyrimidine, and Related Derivatives, 32 J. ORG. CHEM. 1462, 1462-68 (1967). 
107 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. 
108 Id. at 981. 
109 Id. at 980. 
110 Id.; see also R. A. Sharma et al., Synthesis of Gem- Difluorosaccharides, 95 TETRAHEDRON LETT. 3433, 
3433 (1977).  
111 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 982. 
112 R. A. Sharma et al., supra note 110, at 3434-35. 
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eventually abandoned his efforts towards the blockbuster drug. 113  Dr. Donald 
Bergstrom114 also aimed his synthetic efforts towards gemcitabine.115 While he was able 
to synthesize a 3’,3’-gemdifluoronucleoside (shown in Figure 5),116 like Dr. Bobek, he 
never prepared gemcitabine and also abandoned his attempts for other nucleoside 
analogs.117 
 
  
Figure 4: Bobek’s  
gem-difluorosaccharide 
Figure 5: Bergstrom’s  
3’,3-gemdifluoronucleoside 
 
Like the many researchers probing the bounds of fluorine chemistry as applied to 
therapeutic nucleosides, Eli Lilly pursued fluorinated nucleosides and tried to license 
fluorinated compounds from Sloan Kettering.118 When the parties could not reach a 
licensing agreement, Dr. Hertel, an Eli Lilly employee, proposed a new strategy to access 
geminal difluoronucleosides. 119  Dr. Hertel believed his methods would produce a 
nucleoside analog with two fluorine atoms at the C-2’ position, even though his proposal 
was “dismissed by other researchers as a ‘method of limited usefulness.’”120 
 
The key step in Dr. Hertel’s first proposed route to gemcitabine involved a 
Sharpless epoxidation reaction.121 From May to September in 1981, Dr. Hertel attempted 
to synthesize a compound that would lead to gemcitabine by “[trying] at least four 
                                                
113 For select publications regarding modified nucleosides from Dr. Bobek’s laboratory, see J. Perman et. 
al, Synthesis of 1-(2-deoxy-β-D-erythro-pentofuranosyl)-5-ethynyl-1,2,3,4-tetrahydropyrimidine-2,4-dione 
(5-ethynyl-2'-deoxyuridine), 28 TETRAHEDRON LETT. 2427 (1976); Ram A. Sharma & Miroslav Bobek, 
Acetylenic nucleosides. 1. Synthesis of 1-(5,6-Dideoxy-ß-D-ribo-hex-5-ynofuranosyl)uracil and 1-(2,5,6-
Trideoxy- ß-D-erythro-hex-5-ynofuranosyl)-5-methyluracil, 43 J. ORG. CHEM. 367 (1978); Miroslav Bobek 
& Vicki Martin, The synthesis of anomeric 3-O-acetyl-5-O-benzoyl-2-azido-2-deoxy-D-arabinofuranosyl 
chlorides. Versatile sugar intermediates for the synthesis of 2'-azido-2'-deoxy- and 2'-amino-2'-deoxy-β-D-
arabinofuranosyl nucleosides, 22 TETRAHEDRON LETT. 1919 (1978). 
114 Professor of Chemistry at Purdue University. See Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 983. 
115 Id. 
116 Donald E. Bergstrom et al., 3’,3’-Difluoro-3’-deoxythymidine: Comparison of Anti-HIV Activity to 3’-
Fluoro-3’-deoxythymidine, 35 J. MED. CHEM. 3369, 3369-72 (1992). 
117 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sicor Pharm., Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 971, 983 (S.D. Ind. 2010).  
118 Id. at 984. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. 
121 Id.; for the Sharpless epoxidation reaction mechanism, see JI JACK LI, NAME REACTIONS: A COLLECTION 
OF DETAILED REACTION MECHANISMS, 366-67 (2d ed. 2003). 
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categories” of the epoxidation reaction.122 When his efforts failed, Dr. Hertel consulted 
with renowned Drs. Barry Sharpless123 and David Evans124 who both thought Hertel’s 
route would prove successful.125 However, after months of failure, Hertel pursued a 
second, more direct route that used DAST as a fluorine source.126 But this approach failed 
too. Hertel then investigated a new route using a Reformatsky reaction,127 which finally 
produced the desired difluoronated intermediate needed to access gemcitabine (Figure 
6).128  
 
 
Figure 6: Hertel’s advanced intermediate en route to gemcitabine  
 
Despite Hertel’s triumph in producing the difluorinated sugar, completing the 
final steps of the gemcitabine synthesis was not a simple matter. “Introduc[ing] fluorine 
into an organic molecule . . . significantly alters the chemistry of that molecule by 
deactivating some centers or activating others to reactions . . . so essentially, you had to 
kind of learn organic chemistry all over again.”129 As a result, Hertel spent the next nine 
months trying to convert his intermediate into gemcitabine.130 Finally, in June 1982, 
Hertel completed the first total synthesis of gemcitabine131 and its antiviral activity was 
demonstrated later that month.132 Lilly filed its initial patent application for Hertel’s 
fluorinated nucleoside on March 10, 1983.133 Subsequent testing revealed gemcitabine’s 
“unprecedented activity against a broad spectrum of cancers.”134 
 
3.  The Aftermath of Gemcitabine’s Successful Conclusion 
                                                
122 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 984. 
123  Nobel Prize-winning chemist who developed the Sharpless epoxidation reaction. See 
http://www.scripps.edu/sharpless/ (last visted Jan. 6 2012).  
124 Professor of Chemistry at Harvard University. See http://www2.lsdiv.harvard.edu/labs/evans/index.html 
(last visited Jan. 6 2012). 
125 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 984-85. 
126 Id. at 985. 
127 For the Reformatsky reaction mechanism, see LI, supra note 121, at 329.  
128 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 985; L. W. Hertel et al., Synthesis of 2-Deoxy-2,2-difluoro-D-ribose 
and 2-Deoxy-2,2-difluoro-D-ribofuranosl Nucleosides, 53 J. ORG. CHEM. 2406 (1988). 
129 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 985. 
130 Id.  
131 Dr. Robert Farr and Dr. Brian Metcalf at Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals also explored numerous 
synthetic routes towards gemcitabine. Dr. Farr eventually synthesized the compound, but not until 
December 1984, at the earliest. Id. at 984.  
132 Id. at 985. 
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 987. 
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In 2010, generic pharmaceutical companies Sicor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Teva 
Pharmaceuticals tried to invalidate Lilly’s patent on gemcitabine. 135  Of the many 
arguments set forth, the generic drug companies argued that Lilly’s gemcitabine patent 
was obvious based on its structural similarity to prior art.136 In particular, the defendants 
contended that anticancer agents Ara-C, 2’-F-cytidine, and 2’-F-ara-C, and (Figure 7) 
would have motivated a person of ordinary skill to synthesize Eli Lilly’s blockbuster 
drug.137 But the Southern District of Indiana was not persuaded. In upholding Lilly’s 
gemcitabine patent, the court emphasized the (1) “track record of failure prior to Lilly’s 
success with gemcitabine,”138 and (2) long-felt need for treating pancreatic cancer,139 
“one of the most lethal cancers.” 140  
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Figure 7: Ara-C, 2-F-Ara-C, 2’-F-cytidine, and gemcitabine 
 
The defendant pharmaceutical companies attempted to “prove obviousness by 
virtue of gemcitabine’s structural similarity” to Ara-C, 2’-F-cytidine, and 2’-F-ara-C (see 
Figure 7).141 This argument did not convince the court. Though the structural similarities 
among these compounds may have been evident, the years spent formulating gemcitabine 
show that its realization was not a foregone conclusion. A given compound may be an 
obvious starting point for producing its structurally related analog, but it does not 
necessarily provide “meaningful precedent”142 for the synthesis of its analogs. Visual 
similarity does not always translate into a straightforward route in the laboratory. 
Gemcitabine illustrates this point. Collectively, Drs. Bobek, Bergstrom, and researchers 
at Merrell Dow 143  spent many years investigating numerous synthetic routes to 
                                                
135 United States Patent No. 4,808,614. Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 975. 
136 Id. at 1001-04. 
137 Id. at 1001. 
138 Id. at 1009. 
139 Id. at 1008. 
140 Jennifer L. Spratlin & John R. Mackey, Human Equilibrative Nucleoside Transporter 1 (hENT1) in 
Pancreatic Adenocarcinoma: Towards Individualized Treatment Decisions 2 CANCERS 2044 (2010). 
141 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. Ara-C has a hydroxyl group (OH) “up” at the 2’ position, 
while 2’-F-ara-C and 2’-F-cytidine have one fluorine atom at the C-2’ position in the “up” and “down” 
position, respectively. Gemcitabine, on the other hand, possesses two fluorine atoms on the C-2’ carbon.  
142 Id. 
143 Dr. Farr and Dr. Metcalf at Merrell Dow produced gemcitabine after Eli Lilly and failed to show that 
they conceived of the compound prior to Lilly. Id. at 996-97. 
CHICAGO – KENT COLLEGE OF LAW 
11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 146 
160 
gemcitabine.144 Yet, their “ultimately unsuccessful” attempts did not yield the compound 
or any nucleoside analog with two fluorine atoms at the C-2’ position.145 Thus, the court 
held that, “[i]n light of the fact that all of these methods were attempted and 
unsuccessfully so in the years leading up to and including the time that Lilly invented 
gemcitabine, it is abundantly clear that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
been uncertain as to how to synthesize gemcitabine.”146  
 
The need for a particular compound was also important to the obviousness 
analysis in Eli Lilly. Before the development of gemcitabine, only two drugs, fluorouracil 
(5-FU) and mitomycin, obtained FDA approval for the treatment of pancreatic cancer.147 
And only 5-FU had been approved for treating solid tumors at the time the gemcitabine 
patent application was filed.148 While “5-FU in particular held some promise for survival 
benefit [for patients with pancreatic cancer],” it failed to “demonstrate a significant 
increase in survival or pain relief.”149 Moreover, the anticancer agents that defendant 
pharmaceutical companies proffered as prior art for gemcitabine were similarly 
ineffective. “Ara-C was ‘good as an anticancer drug,’ [but] its usefulness was limited to 
leukemia.”150 Likewise, 2’-F-cytidine, and 2’-F-ara-C had insufficient antitumor and 
antiviral activity and were abandoned by Sloan-Kettering “[b]ecause of such 
deficiencies.”151  
 
Unlike its predecessors, gemcitabine offers an improved one-year survival that is 
nine times better than the previous treatment for pancreatic cancer.152 Since its FDA 
approval in 1996, gemcitabine has been used universally to treat around 1.5 million 
patients.153 While gemcitabine has a “broad efficacy in humans against a variety of 
cancers,”154 it remains the leading treatment advanced pancreatic cancer.155 The court 
noted that the National Comprehensive Cancer Network made gemcitabine—not 5-FU—
the “standard of care” for pancreatic cancer 156  and that gemcitabine exhibits an 
“improved capacity to kill cancer cells over Ara-C.”157  Furthermore, even though 
pancreatic cancer continues to have “the worst mortality rate and the lowest overall 
                                                
144 Id. at 999. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 988. 
148 Id. at 1009. 
149 Id. at 988. 
150 Id. at 1003. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 979. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 987. 
155 Id. at 1008. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 987. 
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survival (OS) in all cancers,”158 and gemcitabine is not a cure, “it was the first drug in 
thirty years to produce an improvement in overall survival.”159 
 
Given these facts, gemcitabine clearly filled a gap in cancer treatment. In 
discussing the long-felt need, the district court stated, “despite the existence . . . [of 
anticancer treatments before gemcitabine], the need for more effective chemotherapeutic 
agents for the treatment of solid tumors like those in pancreatic cancer still existed in the 
early 1980s.”160 As a result, patients with this disease “consistently faced a particularly 
negative prognosis because no chemotherapy was available that was effective as a 
treatment.”161 Thus, the district court held that “it is clear that gemcitabine met a long-felt 
need.” The court’s consideration of the long-felt need for effective cancer treatment 
speaks to the potentially large role that societal need can serve in the obviousness 
analysis. It follows that pharmaceutical patentees who develop a drug that fills a gap in 
medical treatment should survive an obviousness challenge—especially when coupled 
with the failure of others to mend that gap.  
 
ii.  Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharmaceuticals, SRL v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 162 
 
Similarly, Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharmaceuticals, SRL v. Teva Pharmaceuticals 
USA, Inc. illustrates the influential role of (1) others’ failure to bring an innovative drug 
to market; and (2) the long-felt but unmet need for a safe and effective drug in evaluating 
obviousness. The Merck case involved the development of Singulair®, an anti-asthma 
medication realized after years of research into the field of leukotrienes.163,164 In an 
attempt to invalidate Merck’s patent for montelukast, the active ingredient in Singulair®, 
Teva argued that the creation of montelukast was obvious in view of the prior art.165 In 
upholding Merck’s montelukast patent, the District Court for the District New Jersey 
reviewed the history of leukotriene research, considered the need created by the asthma 
epidemic, and ultimately disagreed with Teva’s obviousness argument.166 
 
1.  Background of Leukotrienes Chemistry and Biology 
 
                                                
158 The occurrence of pancreatic cancer has “increased with 42,470 predicated new cases in the United 
States in 2009, in which 35,240 [people] will die.” Xianjun Yu et al., Targeted Drug Delivery in Pancreatic 
Cancer, 1805 BIOCHIM. BIOPHYS. ACTA 97, 97-98 (2010). 
159 Eli Lilly & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 1008. 
160 Id. at 988. 
161 Id. 
162 No. 07-1596 (GEB)(DEA), 2009 WL 3153316 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2009). 
163 Id. at **18-21. 
164 For a discussion regarding leukotriene chemistry, see R. N. Young et al., Design and Synthesis of 
Sodium (βR*,γS*)-4-[[3-(4-Acetyl-3-hydroxy-2-propyl-phenoxy)propyl]thio]-γ-hydroxy-β-methyl-
benzenebutanoate: A Novel, Selective, and Orally Active Receptor Antagonist of Leukotriene D4, 29 J. 
MED. CHEM. 1573, 1573 (1986) and references within; leukotrienes are produced in organs, like the lungs, 
and mediate the body’s response to asthma triggers. 
165 Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., SRL, 2009 WL 3153316, at *48. 
166 Id. at **48-54. 
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 “The leukotrienes story begins in the 1930s and 1940s” 167  when two 
physiologists discovered that the guinea pig lung produces a substance that causes the 
smooth muscle tissue in the lungs to contract.168 This substance was later called slow-
reacting substance of anaphylaxis, or SRS-A.169 Scientists hypothesized that SRS-A was 
also produced in humans and “play[ed] a critical role in human asthma.”170 
 
Even though research was initially impeded by SRS-A’s limited availability, 
instability, and unknown structure, SRS-A nevertheless interested many researchers 
studying asthma.171 For example, in 1973, scientists at Fisons Ltd. in England discovered 
FPL-55712, a compound that prevented SRS-A from causing contractions in the smooth 
muscle tissue, presumably by blocking SRS-A (see Figure 8).172 However, despite this 
breakthrough, FPL-55712 was not an ideal drug candidate “because it was inactive when 
taken orally (the ideal mode of dosing any drug) and had a very short half-life in the 
body[,] even when it was given intravenously.”173 
 
In the late 1970s, E.J. Corey174 and coworkers discovered that SRS-A was 
composed of three leukotrienes: leukotriene C4 (LTC4); leukotriene D4 (LTD4); and 
leukotriene E4 (LTE4).175 These compounds act on a single common receptor,176 with 
LTD4 being the most potent compound 177  (see Figure 8 for structure of LTD4). 
Considering that LTD4 is the primary component of SRS-A, researchers theorized that 
asthmatic reactions would be prevented by developing a compound that would bind with 
the LTD4 receptor, thus blocking LTD4 .178 
                                                
167 Gleason, supra note 74, at 5. 
168 See generally William Kingsbury et al., Leukotriene Receptors, in 3 COMPREHENSIVE MEDICINAL 
CHEMISTRY 763-96 (Peter G. Sammes & John B. Taylor eds., 1990) (for a review article detailing status of 
leukotriene receptors through 1990); see also Gleason, supra note 74, at 5-18. 
169 Young, supra note 164, at 1573.  
170 Gleason, supra note 74, at 5. 
171 Id. at 6; Robert N. Young, Discovery of Montelukast: a Once-a-Day Oral Antagonist of Leukotriene D4 
for the Treatment of Chronic Asthma, 38 PROGRESS IN MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 249, 250 (2001). 
172 J. Augstein, J. B. Farmer, T. B. Lee, P. Sheard, M. L. Tattersall, Selective inhibitor of slow-reacting 
substance of anaphylaxis, 245 NATURE 215 (1973); Robert N. Young, supra note 171, at 250. 
173 Gleason, supra note 74, at 6. 
174 Nobel Prize-winning chemist. See http://www.chem.harvard.edu/research/faculty/elias_corey.php (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2012). 
175 Gleason, supra note 74, at 6; see also Robert A. Lewis et al., Slow Reacting Substances of Anaphylaxis: 
Identification of Leukotrienes C-1 and D from Human and Rat Sources, 77 PROC. NATI. ACAD. SCI. USA 
3710 (1980); Robert A. Lewis et al., Identification of the C(6)-S-Conjugate of Leukotriene A with Cysteine 
as a Naturally Occurring Slow Reacting Substance of Anaphylaxis (SRS-A). Importance of the 11-cis-
Geometry for Biological Activity, 96 BIOCHEM. BIOPHYS. RES. COMMUN. 271-77 (1980). 
176 A receptor is a structure, typically a protein, which selectively binds to a molecule on the external 
surface of the cell. This interaction changes the cell’s activity and starts a programmed response by the cell. 
For example, LTD4 binds to the LTD4 receptor and causes an inflammatory response in the body. See 
generally SILVERMAN, supra note 27, at 122-37. 
177 C. K. Buckner et al., Pharmacological Evidence that Human Intralobar Airways Do Not Contain 
Different Receptors that Mediate Contractions to Leukotriene C4 and Leukotriene D4, 237 THE JOURNAL 
OF PHARMACOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 558 (1986); see also Gleason, supra note 74, at 7. 
178 Gleason, supra note 74, at 6-7. 
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Figure 8: leukotriene D4 and FPL-55712 
 
2.  The Pursuit of a Safe and Effective Asthma Treatment 
 
Armed with new structural and biological information about SRS-A and LTD4, 
many pharmaceutical companies entered the global race for a safe and effective asthma 
treatment.179 In the 1980s, medicinal chemists either: (1) modified the structure of LTD4 
or FPL-55712; or (2) screened for compounds showing promising activity.180 Smith Kline 
& French (“SK&F”), now GlaxoSmithKline, initially modified the structure of LTD4.181 
After substantial modifications and biological testing, SK&F synthesized a group of 
promising compounds.182 SK&F 104353 (also called pobliukast, Figure 9), one of 
SK&F’s most biologically useful compounds, advanced to clinical trials in humans.183 
However, SK&F terminated testing after pobliukast failed to show the required 
efficacy.184 Scientists at SK&F subsequently reduced their work on in-house compounds 
after licensing another LTD4 antagonist, pranlukast, from the Japanese company, Ono 
Pharmaceuticals (shown in Figure 11).185 
 
 
 
Figure 9: SK&F 104353 (pobilukast) 
Eli Lilly explored a different route towards an LTD4 antagonist by modifying the 
structure of FPL-55712.186 Lilly developed a number of compounds with promising 
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180  Peter R. Bernstein, Chemistry and Structure–Activity Relationships of Leukotriene Receptor 
Antagonists, 157 AM. J. RESIR. CRIT. CARE MED. S220, S220 (1998).  
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182 Thomas W. Ku et al., Synthesis and LTD4 Antagonist Activity of 2-Norleukotriene Analogues, 28 J. 
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biological activity,187 but Lilly later abandoned the drug candidates after studies revealed 
liver toxicity in rats and mice.188 
 
Imperial Chemical Industries (“ICI”) focused on the structural similarities 
between both FPL-55712 and LTD4 itself (see Figure 8 for the structures of FPL-55712 
and LTD4).189 After substantial research and development, ICI synthesized zarfirlukast, 
which is sold under the brand name Accloate® by AstraZeneca (Figure 10).190 While 
zarfirlukast has many positive qualities, it requires twice-a-day dosing191 and has caused 
patients to suffer liver injury.192  
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Figure 10: ICI 204219 (Accolate®) 
 
Researchers at Ono Pharmaceuticals chose an alternative route by beginning their 
studies with the lead compound shown in Figure 11, which was probably selected through 
randomized screening.193 In collaboration with SK&F, Ono developed pranlukast (ONO 
1078).194 SK&F subsequently abandoned their efforts towards pranlukast, while Ono 
pursued the compound and currently sells the drug in Japan (Figure 11).195 
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Figure 11: Ono’s lead compound and pranlukast 
Like Ono, researchers at Revlon Inc., Phone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals Inc., 
and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals also chose a lead compound other than LTD4 and FPL-55712 
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in the hopes of developing a better asthma treatment. 196  However, all companies 
abandoned their respective compounds due to safety and efficacy concerns.197  
 
In 1979, Merck began their search for an asthma treatment by screening their 
chemical library for potential LTD4 antagonists.198 This resulted in a lead compound 
whose structure was similar to FPL-55712.199 After substantial modifications and testing, 
Merck developed L-649,923 and L-648,051 (Figure 12).200 These promising compounds 
exhibited excellent LTD4 antagonist activity, but were ultimately abandoned due to 
insufficient efficacy.201  
 
 
 
Figure 12: L-649,923 and L-648,051 
 
“The Merck research team returned to the drawing board, identifying another lead 
compound by screening Merck’s chemical library.”202 Merck chemists then modified a 
different lead structure to yield L-660,711, also known as MK-0571 (Scheme 1).203 While 
L-660,711 showed promising activity in humans, safety studies revealed that the 
compound caused liver weight changes in animals, which could result in cancer.204 Upon 
further analysis, Merck chemists found that only one of the enantiomers in L-660,711 
caused the liver toxicity.205 Thus, the other enantiomer, called verlukast, progressed to 
human clinic trials.206 Verlukast, however, raised new liver toxicity concerns and was 
abandoned.207 
                                                
196 Id. at 12-13. 
197 Id. at 13. 
198 Plaintiff Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., SRL’s Pretrial Brief at 11, Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., 
SRL v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 07-1596 (GEB)(JJH), 2009 WL 3153316 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2009). 
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200  Id.; see also T. R. Jones et al., L-649,923, Sodium (βS*,γR*-4-(3-(4-acetyl-3-hydroxy-2-
propylphenoxy)propylthio)-γ-hydroxy-β-methylbenzenebutanoate, a selective, orally active leukotriene 
receptor antagonist, 64 CAN. J. PHYSIOL. PHARMACOL. 1068, 1068-75 (1986); T. R. Jones et al., L-648,051, 
sodium 4-[3-(4-acetyl-3-hydroxy-2-propylphenoxy)-propylsulfonyl]-γ-oxo-benzenebutanoate: a leukotriene 
D4 receptor antagonist, 64 CAN. J. PHYSIOL. PHARMACOL. 1535, 1535-42 (1986). 
201 Plaintiff Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., SRL’s Pretrial Brief at 11, Merck Sharp & Dohme Pharm., 
SRL v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2009 WL 3153316 (2009) (No. 07-1596 (GEB)(JJH). 
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chemical composition, but which exist as non-superimposable mirror images of one another (called 
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Despite earlier failures, Merck’s chemists did not abandon their efforts towards a 
safe and effective LTD4 antagonist. Because of its promising activity, chemists used L-
660,711 as a foundation for further development.208 Then, “[u]sing a trial and error 
approach,” chemists made many structural modifications to L-660,711 (Scheme 1).209 For 
example, replacing the sulfur atom in the Q2 side chain with a carbon atom did not 
change the compound’s potency. 210  Further studies showed that the amide group 
prevented the compound from remaining in the body for the desired timeframe.211 To 
overcome this obstacle, chemists replaced the amide with a variety of other groups, and 
eventually found that incorporating a tertiary alcohol into the compound solved the short 
half-life problem. 212  But further modification was still needed to overcome the 
compound’s toxicity problems.213 The key was installing an additional carbon atom in the 
Q1 side chain and attaching a cyclopropyl group at the beta-position.214 These final 
changes resulted in montelukast215—a molecule that changed the world.216 
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Scheme 1: Formation of montelukast from L-660,711  
 
3.  Winning the Race: the Success of Montelukast 
 
In an attempt to invalidate Merck’s patent for montelukast, Teva argued that the 
montelukast patent was obvious in view of prior art.217 Teva asserted that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would have selected its lead compound (Scheme 2) as a starting 
point and converted it into montelukast through “at least eleven distinct steps.”218  
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Teva’s proposed synthesis of montelukast begins by converting L-660,711 into 
Teva’s lead compound (Scheme 2).219 According to Teva’s expert, Dr. George Lenz, it 
would have been obvious to modify the Q2 side chain in L-660,711 by replacing the 
sulfur atom with a carbon atom, adding a phenyl group, and then attaching a substituent 
X to the phenyl ring.220 Choosing a dimethyl amide for the “X” position in Teva’s lead 
structure would yield compound 97,221 a compound previously synthesized by Merck.222 
Continuing from this point, one must then decide to modify compound 97 by replacing 
the dimethyl amide with a tertiary alcohol, lengthening the Q1 side chain, adding a 
cyclopropyl group to the beta position, and then resolving the enantiomers to yield the 
desired enantiomer of montelukast.223 
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Scheme 2: Teva’s proposed synthesis of Montelukast from L-660,711  
via Teva’s lead compound 
Teva’s lengthy projected pathway from L-660,711 to montelukast did not 
convince the court that the road to montelukast was obvious. The structural similarity 
between Teva’s lead compound and montelukast gives no indication of the immense 
effort required to bridge the gap between the two. For example, the installation of the 
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tertiary alcohol and the cyclopropyl group was no small feat. Replacing the dimethyl 
amide in L-660,711 with the tertiary alcohol in montelukast was initially met with 
skepticism.224 Dr. Robert Young, the leader of the Merck leukotriene team, reasoned that 
even though tertiary alcohols and dimethyl amides are similar in size, the two moieties 
have different shapes “in the area where you would expect hydrogen binding to occur” 
and this dissimilarity in size “is [an] important difference.”225 Moreover, tertiary alcohols 
like the one in montelukast (called a benzylic tertiary alcohol) are characteristically 
unstable and “are expected to decompose in even mildly acidic conditions. So it is very 
unusual to see a tertiary alcohol on a drug [due to the human stomach’s acidity].”226 
Likewise, “cyclopropyl groups were difficult to make and therefore were not commonly 
used [in drug development].”227 Furthermore, Dr. John Gleason, the leader of SK&F’s 
leukotriene program testified “that ‘in this timeframe, 1990, cyclopropyl groups were not 
easy to make’ and that ‘[c]yclopropyl is not commonly used.’”228  
 
Further damaging to Teva’s obviousness argument is that medicinal chemists 
from leading pharmaceutical companies used a variety of approaches to identify a lead 
compound.229 Some researchers chose to modify the structure of the naturally occurring 
compound LTD4, while others modified FPL-55712, and yet others fished for a lead 
compound from a chemical library.230 This grab bag of approaches resulted in many 
promising compounds that never made it to market.231 Dr. Gleason of SK&F later 
remarked that “over the period of about 12 years [SK&F] progressed several compounds 
into human clinical trials, but was unsuccessful in progressing a single leukotriene 
antagonist compound through to the market.”232 Likewise, “Eli Lilly & Co., Revlon, 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, [and] Wyeth Pharmaceuticals” all had compounds in “advanced 
stages of development” that were abandoned before commercial development.233 Of 
Merck’s many competitors, only Imperial Chemical Industries delivered a drug to the 
marketplace, although Accolate® has liver toxicity side effects.234 Unlike its competitors, 
Merck was successful in bringing a safe and effective asthma treatment to market. Thus, 
the court could not ignore Merck’s triumph amidst “the failure of others to develop a 
commercially useful leukotriene antagonist.”235 The court’s decision in Merck’s favor 
further strengthens the causal link between the failure of others and a ruling of non-
obviousness. In 1998, the FDA approved the use of Singulair® tablets236 to treat asthma 
in pediatric and adult patients and other dosages to treat allergic conditions such as 
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allergic rhinitis.237 Asthma is a chronic disease, which causes inflammation of the lung 
airways. “The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 100-150 million people 
worldwide (equivalent to about half the population of the USA) were suffering from 
asthma in 2000, with the global death toll exceeding 180,000 per year.”238  
 
While asthma treatments existed before the development of Singulair®, the 
market had a long-felt need for a drug that had fewer side effects and was easier to 
administer. Traditional treatments such as inhaling steroids were ineffective at low doses 
and associated with “severe side effects at higher doses.”239 Moreover, long-acting beta 
antagonists must be used in combination with an inhaled steroid and carry a “black box” 
warning, which indicates side effects causing an increased chance of death.240 Further, 
these “symptom-alleviating medication[s]” pale in comparison to Singulair®, which 
“prevent[s] the [asthma] attack from occurring in the first place.”241 As a result, the 
Merck court held that the “other drugs available prior to montelukast’s inception showed 
significant shortcomings.”242  
 
The district court also refused to let other leukotriene-related drugs like 
Accolate® and Zyfo® stand in the way of Merck’s blockbuster. Simply put, Accolate® 
and Zyfo® are not as safe and effective as Singulair®.243 Accolate®, another leukotriene 
antagonist, must be taken twice a day, cannot be taken with food, and is plagued by liver 
toxicity issues.244 Likewise, Zyflo®, a leukotriene inhibitor, must be taken four times a 
day and is also associated with liver toxicity.245 On the other hand, Singulair® is “the 
only LTD4 antagonist currently on the market that is indicated for once-a-day use.”246 
Thus, the drug is easier to take than its competitors and is therefore advantageous for 
treating children.247 Notably, the Global Initiative for Asthma (GINA) has recommended 
“montelukast as an accepted management therapy for the treatment of asthma.”248 As a 
result, the court concluded that “it is clear that montelukast fulfills a long-felt but 
unsolved need for asthma and allergic rhinitis sufferers.”249 This decision rightly elevates 
long-felt need to a position of importance in the obviousness analysis.  
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III.  APPLYING SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS TO ANALOGS: CRITICAL RESPONSE AND 
THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
For several reasons, gemcitabine and montelukast are excellent case studies of the 
practical considerations impacting the obviousness of structurally related compounds. 
With an eye towards fulfilling a societal need in disease treatment, researchers in each 
case modified the structure of a lead compound to yield a drug that immensely benefited 
society. The methodical research process that produced gemcitabine and montelukast and 
the years of failed attempts that preceded their development are typical of drug 
discovery.250 As such, these cases show that practical considerations such as the failure of 
others and long-felt need are especially relevant to the drug discovery process. 
 
As is characteristic of courts considering the obviousness of structurally related 
compounds, both district courts placed primary emphasis on the unexpected efficacy and 
safety of gemcitabine and montelukast.251 However, the district courts found additional 
support for non-obviousness in the failure of others and long-felt need. This fact is a 
necessary step towards acknowledging the important role of these secondary 
considerations in the obviousness analysis of structurally related compounds. However, 
the courts’ opinions neglect to elevate these factors to a leading position in the analysis, 
which would be consistent with their applicability to the drug development process.  
 
Going forward, when considering the obviousness of structurally related 
compounds like analogs, courts should place the utmost importance on the failure of 
others to develop a drug and the long-felt but unmet need that the drug fulfills. Because 
these factors are in step with the path of drug development, allowing pharmaceutical 
patentees to rely on these practical factors when seeking patent rights will encourage 
innovator firms to purse complex research and not abandon their efforts after 
disappointing results. “Many times during the course of human history, small molecules 
have cured tens of millions of people of serious diseases and improved the quality of 
life.”252 Surely the patentability of structurally related molecules should not turn on 
whether a researcher expresses surprise that one molecule is more effective as a treatment 
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than its analog. Scientific research that sets out to meet a need and succeeds in achieving 
it where others fail must be deemed equally, if not more, worthy of patent protection. By 
promoting the latter goal, courts will encourage scientists to work on hard problems 
whose resolutions can change lives for the better.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
“Close involvement with society is the destiny of science.”253 Molecules that have 
a profound impact on society, like gemcitabine and montelukast, fulfill society’s long-felt 
need to cure disease and improve the quality of life. Scientific research would be stifled if 
chemical patents could be invalidated merely because a compound resembles another 
previously developed or because a compound’s properties aren’t unexpected. Using 
pragmatic considerations such as the failure of others to produce a compound (itself a 
“superior indicator” of patentability254) and that compound’s ability to meet a societal 
need can prove a powerful argument against obviousness. These factors will encourage 
inventors to continue along the path of discovery—even after years of wrong turns. Firms 
that conclude the race by delivering a needed drug to market should be compensated. 
Such were the cases of gemcitabine and montelukast. 
 
 In highlighting the underappreciated realities of the drug discovery process, the 
immense effort that precedes a drug’s delivery to market, and the profound effect 
pharmaceuticals can have on disease treatment, this Note argues for the elevation of the 
failure of others and long-felt need in the obviousness analysis. Allowing researchers to 
rely on factors synchronized with the nature of chemical research for patent protection, 
rather than unpredictable results, will help drive pharmaceutical science. Because 
innovator drug firms rely on patent protection to fuel expensive and time-consuming R & 
D, the promise of a financial reward for developing a marketable drug is crucial to drug 
development. By rewarding companies that deliver effective drugs for diseases that 
plague society, patent laws have the power to encourage companies to persevere in the 
face of long odds. 
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